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Performance  in  the  food  retailing  industry  cated  that  the laboratory  experiment  provides  an
varies over  time,  among competitive  markets,  and  opportunity to test oligopolistic  theory under con-
among  different  organizational  affiliations.  This  ditions  where  assumptions  are  clearly  specified
paper  reports  the  results  of  a  recent  study  which  and  met,  and extraneous  forces  controlled.  In  the
examined  variation  in firm behavior  and perform-  real  world,  one  knows  little  about  the? circum-
ance  which  could  be  attributed  to  three  phenom-  stances  under  which  data  are  generated.  As  such,
enal: differences  in organizational  affiliation,  dif-  data are ambiguous  and represent changes in many
ferences  among managers  within an  organizational  variables.  As  a practical  matter, Babb,  Leslie  and
affiliation,  and  differences  in the  competitive  en-  Van  Slyke  [4]  explained  that  much  information
vironment  under  which  retailers  operate.  This  which may be obtained through experiments  would
study  differed  from  some  previous  behavioral  not  be  available  from  firm  records.  Exploratory
studies  in  that  an  experimental  business  manage-  work  by  Babb  and  Bohl  [3]  utilized  business
ment  game  was  used  as  the  data  generator.  A  management  games  in  a  research capacity  to exa-
central  thrust  of  this  study  was  to  evaluate  busi-  mine the influence of economic  and non-economic
ness  gaming  as  a  tool  which  allowed  testing  of  factors on firm  behavior  and performance.
hypotheses concerning  economic behavior.
Neoclassical  economic  theory  prescribes  the  METHODOLOGY
behavior  of  purely  competitive  and  monopolistic  management  game was designed  to A business  management  game was designed  to
structures.  Shubik  [11]  explains  that  behavioral  be  used by supermarket  personnel  [2].  This game
prescriptions  are  less definite  in the case  of  oligo-  portrayed  the  internal functioning  of a supermar-
poly,  which  economists  frequently  use  to  charac-  k  prating  in  a  controlled  competitive  environ- ket  operating  in  a  controlled  competitive  environ-
terize  the  food  retailing  industry.  Neoclassical  ment.  The  game's  purpose  was  to  measure  be-
oligopoly  theory  has been  attacked  by revisionists  ha  r  n  h  an  environment  and  simulate firm havior  in  such  an  environment  and  simulate  firm
for  operating  under  unrealistic  assumptions  [5,  and market performance.
12].  Criticisms  included  the  assumptions  of  per-  Twenty  Indiana  food  retailing  managers  were
fect  information,  profit  maximization,  and  the  selected from  three prdetermined  organizational
static nature  of these theories,  affiliations  (fixed)  including  chains,  voluntaries
Cohen  [6],  Weick  [13],  and  Cyert  and  Hed-  and independents.2 The hypothesis tested was that
rick  [8]  have  suggested  simulation  models  and  economic  behavior  and  performance  would  not
laboratory  studies as one means for extending  and  vary  among  the  three  organizational  affiliations.
testing  oligopolistic  theories.  Friedman  [9]  indi-  Because  participants  were  classified  according  to
Assistant  Extension  Professor,  University  of  Kentucky,  Kentucky  Agricultural  Experiment  Station  Journal  Article  No.  74-1-149.
1 Behavior  referred  to  those  price  and non-price  operating  strategies  employed  by  firms  as  they conducted  business.  Performance
was  measured  in  terms  of sales,  profits,  net  worth  and  returns  on net  worth  and returns  on  assets.  Performance  was  function-
ally related  to  behavior  in  that  there  was  a  unique  set  of  performance  criteria  associated  with  each  combination  of behavioral
decisions.
2The  chain  affiliation  referred  to  a  corporation  of  11  or  more  supermarkets  where  decision-making  was  consolidated  at  a
central  headquarters.  Voluntary  affiliation  referred  to  supermarket  owner-operators  who  utilized  a  wholesaler  as  a  source  of
supply  and  closely  followed  the  wholesaler's  advice  on  price  and  non-price  strategies.  The  independent  affiliation  referred  to
owner-operators  who  used wholesalers  as  a  source of  supply but did  not  depend on  them  as  a source  of market  strategy  advice.
205their  organizational  affiliation,  they  were  nested  tion  of  perfect  information  was  nearly  met.  Par-
or restricted  to  that affiliation.  The  second  hypo-  ticipants  were,  however, free  to employ  strategies
thesis tested was that there  would be no difference  of their choice  at  all  times.  The  hypothesis  tested
in  behavior  and  performance  among  managers  was  that  economic  behavior  and  performance
nested within an  organizational  group.  would  not vary with the  competitive  environment
Each  participant  made  24  operating  and  fi-  imposed.
nancial  management  behavioral  decisions  in  the  Subjects  were  given  a  profit-maximizing  goal,
game.  Operating  decisions  included  price  and  and this  goal  was measurable  in  the  sense  that  a
non-price  behavioral  decisions  and  pricing  decis-  profit-maximizing  price  strategy  existed  in  the
ions  included  setting gross  margins  in four  opera-  game.  If  subjects  maximized  profits  as  assumed,
tional  departments  (grocery,  meat,  produce  and  there  would  be  no  variation  in  decisions  among
dairy).  Non-price  decisions  included  procurement  managers  from  different  organizational  groups,
of  goods,  promotion,  and  store  hours.  Financial  and relative  prices  would  not  change  among  dif-
management  decisions  included  opening  and  re-  ferent  imposed competitive  environments.
modeling  stores,  borrowing  and  repaying  money,
and  making  and  calling  investments.  Participants  THE  STATISTICAL  MODEL
competed  against  four  "hypothetical"  supermark-
ets which were  controlled  by the researchers.  Par-  Analysis  of  variance  was  used  to  determine
ticipants were provided  with complete information  differences  in  behavior  and  performance  which
on  their  competitor's  price  and  non-price  strate-  could be  attributed  to each main treatment  effect.
"~~~~~~gies.  ~The  basic model for the nested factorial  design
gies.
was:
Following  each  decision, participant  managers
were  provided  feedback  information  regarding  Yijk  =  Oi4- M(i)j+  Ck+  OCik+  MC( i)ik
their  store's  performance.  Performance  was  di-
vided into "internal efficiency"  variables and "firm  +  (ijk)n
performance"  variables.  Internal  efficiency  mea-
where'
sures  included  labor  as  a  percent  of sales,  inven-  w
tory  levels,  cash  balance,  percent  operating  ex-  Yijkn  = measured  behavior or performance
penses,  financial  leverage  and  asset  turnover.3 variable,
Firm performance  measures  included  sales,  profit  u =  grand mean,
margin,  net worth,  returns  on  assets,  and  returns  O= ith organizational  affiliation, i =  1, 2, 3,
on net worth.
Fol-  M ..=  effect  of jth manager in the ith
Participants  made seven  sets of decisions.  Fol-  o(i)  organizational  form, j= 1,.  .20, organizational  form, j  = 1,..., 20,
lowing  a  practice,  participants  made  two  sets  of  e environment, Ck-  effect  of kth competitive environment,
decisions  in  each  of  three  pre-determined  com-  k=  2  3
petitive  environments  (controlled  directly  by  the  interaction  competitive  environment
OCi  = interaction of competitive environment
researchers).4 Each environment represented  a dis-  and organization  affiliation
tinct  market  strategy  to  which  participants  re-  MC(i)jk = interaction  of competitive  environment
acted  as they  made decisions.  Subjects  were  given  and managersfixedwithin  organiza-
complete  information  about  price  and  non-price  tional affiliation
strategies of their competitors  (the four researcher  =  random error assumed  to be (ijk)n-  random error assumed  to be
controlled  supermarkets).  As a result, the  assump-  NID(O, cr)n =  2  replications.
3 Returns on  assets = Net  profit margin x asset  turnover  where:
$ Profit
Net  Profit Margin  $ Sales
$ Sales
Asset  Turnover  =  $ Assets $ Assets
Returns on Net Worth  =  Return  on  assets x financial  leverage  where:
Net Worth  ±-  Liabilities
Financial  Leverage  Liabilities
4 The  three  competitive  environments  imposed  by  the  researchers  were  a  "discount"  environment  characterized  by  low  gross
margins,  a  "high  service"  environment  characterized  by  high  gross  margins,  and  a  traditional  or  "me-too"  environment  with
margins  between  the  two  extremes.  Information  was  given  to  subjects  concerning  the  non-price  strategies  associated  with  each
competitive  environment  such  as  specials  offered,  use  of  trading  stamps,  advertising  levels  and  store  hour policies.
206Nesting  occurred  as  managers  from  each  Figure  1.  DIAGRAMMATIC  REPRESENTA-
organizational  structure  were  restricted  to  that  TION  OF  THE  ANALYSIS  OF
organization.  A  diagrammatic  representation  is  VARIANCE
shown  in Figure  1. Expected  mean  squares  were
calculated  to  indicate  how  hypotheses  should  be  ORGANIZATIONAL  AFFILIATION
appropriately  tested  (Table  1).  Because  the model  1  2  3
was  fixed,  the results  of this  study  cannot  be  ex-  Competitive
Competitive
tended  to other  organizations,  managers,  or  com-  Environment  Individuals  within  organization
petitive situations.  1 ...  20  21  ...  40  41  ...  60
THE  RESULTS
2
Price Behavior. Organizational  structure  had  a 
significant  effect  on  four  out  of five  measures  of  3
price  behavior  (Table  2).  The  hypothesis  that  —
Table  1.  DEGREES  OF FREEDOM  AND  EXPECTED  MEAN  SQUARES  OF  ANALYSIS  OF
VARIANCE
Source  of  Variation  Symbol  Degrees  of  Freedom  Expected  Mean  Squares
Organizational  Structure  0.  (0-1)  =  2  a2  + 6a2M  + 120  20
2  2
Managers  within  organizational  M(i)  (M-1)0  =  57  a  + 6a  M
structure  for  all  structures  i
Competitive  Environment  C k (C-l)  =  2  o2E  + 2a2MC  + 120  2C k
Organizational  Structure  x  competitive  OCik  (0-1) (C-l)  =  4  a 2  + 2a
2 MC + 40a  2OC
environment
Managers  within  each  organizational  MC  [(M-l)O](C-l)  =  114  a2  + 2a2MC
structure  x competitive  environment  (
Error  term  r(ijk)n  OMC(N-1)  =  180  a  e
Total  OMCN-1  = 359
prices  would  not vary  among  managers  from  dif-  action  between  nested  managers  and  competitive
ferent organizational  affiliations  was thus rejected.  environment  was  significant,  again  demonstrating
Furthermore,  price  responses  among  managers  that  managers  within  an  organizational  structure
nested  within  an  organizational  grouping  were  did not behave uniformly.
significant, indicating that managers do not behave  There  was  a  profit-maximizing  price  strategy
in an uniform  manner just because  they  belong  to  in the  game  which involved  equating  net  marginal
an  organizational  structure.  Hence,  the  hypothesis  revenues  for  various  departments  in  a  store.  Ob-
is  that  there  would  be  no  difference  in  pricing  served  variation  in  gross  margin  decisions  among
among nested  managers  was  rejected.  managers  from  different  organizational  affiliations
Competitive  environment  had  a  significant  im-  and in different  competitive  environments  were not
pact  on  pricing  behavior.  While  manager  pricing  consistent  with profit maximization.  Thus,  the hy-
decisions  suggested that managers  behaved  as price  pothesis  that  participants  would  maximize  profits
followers, they were not willing to change prices  as  was rejected.
much  as the changes  established by the researchers.  Non-Price Behavior.  Organizational  structure
Interaction between organizational  structure  and  had a  significant  effect on  all  non-price  behavioral
competitive  environment  was  generally  not  signi-  measures  except  advertising  and  store  hours  policy
ficant, suggesting that manager behavior in response  (Table 2).  Competitive  environment  had a  signifi-
to changing competitive  environments was generally  cant effect on all non-price  decisions  except stamps
the  same  for  all  organizational  structures.  Inter-  and  store-hours  policy.  Again,  managers  nested
207Table  2.  THE EFFECT OF ORGANIZATIONAL  STRUCTURE  AND  COMPETITIVE ENVIRON-
MENT  ON  BEHAVIORAL  AND  PERFORMANCE  MEASURES  OF FIRM MANAGERS
F-Values
0.  M.  Ck  OC  MC 0  Mi)j  Ck  OC ik  MC(i)jk
Price  Response  Variables
Grocery  Gross  Margin  3.06*  10.08**  59.69**  1.27  2.80**
Meat  Gross  Margin  4.19*  20.43**  22.78**  1.10  2.86**
Produce  Gross  Margin  2.77+  19.51**  77.41**  6.73**  4.05**
Dairy  Gross  Margin  0.03  22.96**  14.74**  1.85  6.31**
Total  Gross  Margin  4.31*  3.97*  48.05**  1.57  2.15**
Non-Price  Response  Variables
Advertising  0.29  9.47**  4.71**  2.93*  1.10
Stamps  6.45**  11.90**  0.36  2.67*  1.93*
Total  Specials  7.67**  14.17**  35.13**  1.90  2.05**
Store  Hour  Policy  2.21  19.41**  1.38  1.13  7.18**
Internal  Firm Efficiency
Labor  as  % Sales  2.57+  8.97**  17.75**  5.70**  1.65**
Inventory  0.71  16.75**  0.76  3.30*  4.14**
Cash  Level  7.24**  6.05**  3.95*  1.30  1.60**
% Operating  Expenses  5.89*  11.85**  44.99**  1.14  1.83**
Financial  Leverage  1.87  3.91**  1.16  2.44  0.97
Asset  Turnover  1.73  7.42**  48.67**  0.93  1.82**
Overall  Firm  Performance
Total  Weekly  Sales  0.02  15.01**  182.98**  3.90**  2.25**
Net  Profit  Margin  7.61**  6.75**  3.37*  1.57  1.66**
Net  Worth  12.10**  7.34**  3.86**  4.23**  6.02**
Return  on  Assets  6.56**  12.12**  7.04**  2.50**  2.56**
Return  on  Net  Worth  7.81**  8.73**  4.88**  2.20+  2.37**
+ significant  beyond .01  level.
* significant beyond  .05 level.
*  significant beyond  .01  level.
within  an  organizational  structure  did  not  behave  Organizational  structure  had  a  significant  ef-
uniformly.  fect  on labor utilization,  cash  levels,  and  on oper-
Hypotheses concerning uniform behavior among  ating  expenses  as  a  percent  of  sales  (Table  2).
managers  from  different  organizational  structures,  Managers  nested within an organizational  affiliation
among  different  competitive  environments,  and  had  a  significant  impact  on  internal  efficiency,
among  managers  nested  within  organizational  affi-  implying  a  great  deal  of variation  in  internal  firm
liation were rejected.  These  findings  reinforced  the  operation.  Competitive  environment  had  a  signi-
importance  of  non-economic  factors  in  business  ficant influence  on  two of  six  measures  of  internal
behavior  and  indicated  that unique  non-price  pro-  efficiency.
motional  mixes  existed  among  the  organizational  Overall Firm Performance. Five  variables  were
affiliations.  used to measure  firm performance.  These included
Internal Firm Efficiency.  Six variables  were  se-  sales,  net profit,  net  worth,  returns  on  assets,  and
lected  to measure  internal firm  operation  including  returns on net worth.
labor  as  a percent  of  sales,  inventory,  cash  level,  Organizational  affiliation  had  a  significant  im-
percent operating  expenses,  financial leverage,  and  pact  on  all  performance  measures  except  total
asset turnover.  weekly  sales  (Table  2).  Independent  firms  were
208found  to be  the  most  profitable,  voluntaries  being  motional  activities  and  store  hour  policies  were
the least profitable.5 Greater control of internal  ex-  obtained  in  a pre-game  questionnaire.  These  data
penses  would  have  enhanced  voluntarie's  profita-  were compared  with similar measures  in the game.
bility.  There  were great  differences  in  the financial  In  the  experiment,  managers  priced  consis-
imp-act  of  these  variables.  While  sales  were  not  tently  with  their  real-world  behavior  about  one-
statistically  different,  net profit  margins  varied  40  half the time.  Several reasons  may be  advanced  to
percent among organizational  affiliations,  net worth  explain  this  lack  of  price  correspondence:  First,
varied  22 percent,  and  returns  on net worth varied  managers  are frequently  unable  to recognize  com-
more  than 46 percent.  Overall  performance  results  petitive  price  levels  in  the  real  world.  Secondly,
were  not  uniform  for  firms  within  organizational  managers  may  have  been  experimenting  in  the
affiliations:  These  results  would  suggest  that  some  game  as they  sought to discover  what would  hap-
firms  from  all  organizational  structures  would  sur-  pen as  decisions were changed. Manager  non-price
vive.  Competitive  environment  had  a  significant  behavior in  the  real  world  was  nearly  identical  to
effect  on all measures  of overall performance.  Firm  that used  in the experiments.  In  a post-game  ques-
profitability was highest in the competitive  environ-  tionnaire,  74  percent  of  the  participants  stated
ment  characterized  by  higher  gross  margins  and  that they  employed  the  same  price  and  non-price
lower levels  of non-price  variables.  strategies  in  the  experiments  as  they  did  in  real
life.  These  results  suggested  that  the game  was  a
EFFICACY  OF  RESEARCH  METHOD  useful  research  tool.  This  approach  was  judged
superior  to  alternative  means  of  data  generation For  business  games  to  be  useful  in  studying  superior  to  alternative  means  of  data  generation
because  of the  experimental  control  afforded,  the firm  behavior,  they  must  be  able  to  create  a 
r  evir  e  m  a  . availability  of  this  type  of  confidential  data,  and realistic  environment  for  decision  making.  Aron- .A^  . .^  ri  'c'the  low cost of data collection. son  and Carlsmith  [1]  classified  realism  as  being
either mundane  or experimental.  Mundane realism  CONCL
is defined as the extent to which events in  a labora-
tory  are  likely  to occur  in  the  real  world.  Experi-  Changes  in competitive  environment did cause
mental  realism  refers  to  how  realistic  the  experi-  participating  food retailers  to alter their  price  and
mental  situation  is  to  the subject,  i.e.,  how  much  non-price  behavior;  hence,  performance  also
impact the experiment has on him or how seriously  changed.  While  pricing  decisions  suggested  that
he  takes  the  experiment.  Campbell  [7]  explained  managers  behaved  as  price  followers,  they  were
that  both  types  of  realism  are  important  in  vali-  not  willing  to  change  prices  as  much  as  those
dating experiments.  established by researchers.
Studies  by  Babb,  Leslie  and  Van  Slyke  [4]  Behavior  and performance  variation was wider
and  Roland  and  Gardner  [10]  reported  a  high  within  an  organizational  affiliation  than  among
degree  of  experimental  realism,  but  limited  in-  affiliations.  This  suggested  that  some  firms  from
formation has  been available on mundane  realism,  all organizational  affiliations  will  survive.
Utilization of  the  supermarket  game  appeared  Organizational  affiliation  did  have  an  impact
to meet the  criteria  of experimental  realism.  Each  on behavior  and  performance of firms  in the  busi-
participant  raised  relevant  questions,  stayed  long  ness  management  game.  Hence,  factors  usually
hours  and  made  spontaneous  statements  to  the  not  considered  in  this  static  theory  of  the  firm
researchers.  In a post-game questionnaire,  99 per-  such  as  organizational  affiliation  do  have  an  im-
cent  of  the  participants  stated  that  they  felt  the  pact  on firm  behavior  and  the  resultant  perform-
experiments  had  training  value.  They  would  rec-  ance.
ommend  the  sessions  to  other  managers.  It  was  The  business  management  gaming  approach
concluded that a high degree  of experimental  real-  for studying  firm  behavior  and  performance  pro-
ism had been  attained.  vided  the  advantages  of  (a)  low  cost  data  collec-
This  research  attempted  to  qualify  mundane  tion,  (b) controlled  conditions  for data generation,
realism  by  comparing  real  world  behavior  with  thus removing  uncertainty as to "cause and effect,"
similar  measures  in  the  game.  Information  on  (c)  high degree  of experimental  realism.  Quantify-
actual  price  policies  relative  to  competitors,  pro-  ing  mundane  realism  resulted  in  consistent  price
5 It  is recognized  that  chains  may  have  advantages  over  independents  or  voluntaries  because  of  their  buying  power,  efficiencies of  distribution,  access  to  capital  and  the  like.  They  did  not  enjoy  such  advantages  in  the  experiments.
209behavior  between  the  game  and  the  real  world  tage  of providing  relevant  behavior  and perform-
about half the time.  ance data.  In fact,  it is doubtful that relevant  data
The gaming approach  also  afforded the advan-  would have been obtained from field studies.
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